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THE QUALIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S SPOUSE
AS A WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no two concepts in the law have had such an
anomalous genesis, such a confused development, or have
been subjected to so many varied corrective measures by
legislative intervention as those dealing with the incompetency and privilege of the spouse at common law. And, it
might be added, a fair amount of the confusion observable
presently in the adjudications and legislative pronouncements is traceable to a failure to appreciate the exact nature
of the relation which obtains between these two concepts.
In order that some semblance of order may be accomplished in this discussion, it will be necessary to keep in mind
three distinct situations: (1) The disqualification of one
spouse to testify for the other at common law; (2) The
privilege of either spouse not to have the other spouse testify
against him or her; and (3) The privilege of both spouses
not to have confidential communications revealed. If these
three situations are noted, it will simplify further analysis to
a considerable degree.
AT COMMON LAW

It has been frequently stated that at common law neither
husband nor wife could testify for or against each other.1
While, in effect, this may not be an incorrect statement of
the law, it fails entirely to suggest that the reasons why one
1 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (12th ed. by 0. W. Holmes, Jr.,
1873) 215; 1 Morgan, First American Edition from the Sixth London Edition of
the Principles of the Law of Evidence (1876) 270, § 175; Jones, The Law of
Evidence in Civil Cases (3rd ed. by W. C. Jones, 1924) § 733; Hughes, An Illustrated Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1907) 278, § 16; Ex Parte Beville, 58
Fla. 170, 50 So. 685, 27 L. R. A. (NS) 273 (1908); Commonwealth v. Allen, 191
Ky. 624, 231 S. W. 41, 16 A. L. R. 484 (1921); William and Mary College v.
Powell, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 372 (1865).
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spouse might not testify for the other are not an explanation
of the rule that one spouse may or may not testify against
the other (i. e., the privilege stated in 2, supra). It is because of the frequency of occurrence of the statement of
these rules together in the same sentence that their separate
identity is lost sight of. That these two rules with respect
to the admissibility of the testimony of one spouse when the
other spouse is a party have had entirely different origin in
the common law has been amply demonstrated. ' In discussing the history of the disqualification of one spouse to testify
for the other at common law as distinguished from the privilege of one spouse not to have the other spouse testify adversely, Mr. Wigmore, in his customary exhaustive manner,
demonstrates that the latter is observable earlier than the
former.' That this should be the fact is apparent after a
few moments reflection. From the nature of privilege, per
se, it presupposes that except for the claim of privilege, the
offered testimony would be receivable. But if the testimonial
disqualification for all purposes of a spouse antedated the
privilege, there would be no raison d'etre for the privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege not to have one spouse testify
against the other inferentially recognizes the admissibility of
testimony for or in favor of the spouse on trial.4 It was at
this last situation that the testimonial disqualification of the
spouse was aimed.
In an attempt to explain or justify the disqualification of
one spouse to testify for the other at common law, many reasons have been assigned, most of them highly specious if
searchingly scrutinized. Briefly, these defenses fall under
five headings: (1) The identity of personality of the
spouses; (2) The identity of interest of the spouses; (3)
The probable bias and unreliability of the offered testimony;
2 1 Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials
at Common Law (2nd ed., 1923) § 600; Vol. 4, § 2227.

8 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2227.
4 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2227, n.
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(4) The consequent danger to marital happiness and mutual
trust between the spouses; and (5) The danger of exposing
the witness-spouse to a searching cross-examination and
force the spouse to make unfavorable admissions against the
other.' While all of the above-mentioned have been subjected to able and adverse criticism, some combination of
them can be found restated and re-emphasized by courts
everywhere, not, incredible as it may seem, to justify the
incompetency of a spouse (since statutes everywhere have
abolished this in various ways) but rather in defense of the
privilege of one spouse not to have the other spouse testify
adversely.' Thus is evidenced the first glimmerings of the
confusion which has animated the courts, and, as will be
presently seen, the various legislatures. The courts seem to
have been dominated by a desire to preserve the marital
state free from the dangers that might accrue if the law
would permit one spouse to give testimony against the other.7
But if this represented the controlling desire and reason for
the rule, it is strange that the common law did not extend
this safeguard to the other family relations so as to disqualify all members of the party's family. Is not the security
and peace of the family just as much jeopardized by the
damaging testimony of the son or daughter of the defendant
as by that of the spouse? Yet the common law did not extend the disqualification to the son qua son or the daughter
qua daughter or the other family relations. In this respect
the common law did not receive its inspiration from the civil
or ecclesiastical law.8
5

1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 601.
Ex Parte Beville, op. cit. supra note 1; Bassett v. The United States, 137
U. S. 496, 11 S. Ct. 165, 34 L. Ed. 762 (1890) (Citing with approval the language
of Mr. Justice McLean in Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 222); Commonwealth
v. Allen, op. cit. supra note 1; Knowles v. People, 19 Mich. 408 (1867); Chamberlayne, A Treatise on the Modem Law of Evidence (Ed. by H. C. Joyce, 1916)
§ 3655, and cases cited.
7 2 Kent, op. cit. supra note 1, § 179.
8 Makenzie, Studies in Roman Law (3rd ed., 1870) 331; 1 Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 575, n. 13.
6
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The history of the privilege of the party-spouse not to
have the other spouse testify adversely resembles that of
marital disqualification in the obscurity of its genesis, the
confusion of its development, and the lack of appreciation
of its, eparate identity by courts and legislatures alike.'
Suffice it to say that many of the reasons already advanced
in defense of the disqualification of the spouse found more
justification when applied to the privilege not to have the
adverse testimony of the spouse. This is true especially with
respect to the preservation of the marital state free from the
searching scrutiny of a court or other fact-finding tribunal.
More credence may be given to this policy when it is remembered that the marital disqualification appeared chronologically along about the time that disqualification based on interest generally was being crystallized into a definite rule
of law.' ° It might well be that inarticulate emphasis was
given to the interest aspect of the marital disqualification
rather than to disqualification growing out of the status per
se. At any rate, the fusion of the reasons above mentioned,
and their convertible application alike to disqualification
and privilege has served to present a problem to the various
legislative bodies which have attempted to deal with it,
which, it is submitted, they have failed to fully comprehend. 1 The disqualification element has been disposed of in
most jurisdictions either directly, or inferentially, by defining the competent witness in such terms that a spouse falls
within the category. 2 It is not necessary, therefore, to dwell
at any length on this phase of the problem. However, the
attempt on the part of various legislative bodies to (so it
seems) preserve in some form or other the common law rule
9 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2227.
10

1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 600.

11 Wigmore, A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, 2
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 691, at p. 693.
12 1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 488, n. (Cf. for a collection of various

state statutes.)
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with respect to privilege as applied to criminal cases has
produced a maze of complexity.
The anomaly observable in the fact that the common law
confined the testimonial disqualification to the marital parties and did not extend it to the other members of the family,
has heretofore been adverted to. It has been further pointed
out that in the civil law the disqualification was extended
to include other family relationships. For the reason that
the State of Louisiana has been traditionally committed to
the civil law,1" and for the further reason that the Civil
Codes and Revised Civil Codes adopted by the State of
Louisiana, preserved the civil law disqualifications until the
revision of the year eighteen hundred and seventy, 4 it will
be of more than passing interest to trace the various legislative pronouncements and the adjudications in this jurisdiction with respect to the problem stated. It should be noted
at this point, however, that although the State of Louisiana
espoused the Code Napoleon as its substantive law, the procedure and rules of evidence invoked in criminal trials were
taken from the common law. And this by force of a legislative provision." Thus the courts have always looked to
the common law adjudications whenever questions of evidence and procedure in criminal trials have confronted them.
Furthermore, the present unsatisfactory state of the law
presents a typical example of the confusion rampant in other
jurisdictions.
13 Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana (Ed. by A. J. Bonomo).
(Cf. Introduction by H. P. Dart, p. xxxv.).
14 Revised Civil Code of Louisiana (1870) Art. 2281: "The competent witness of any covenant or fact, whatever it may be, in civil matters, is a person of
proper understanding. The husband cannot be a witness for or against his wife,
nor the wife for or against the husband . . ."
15 Acts of 1805, Chapt. 50,sec. 33, page 440. (Known as the Crimes Act.) "Et
ilest, de plus, dacrt; Que tous les crimes, offenses, et d~lits ci-dessus d~sign~s
par le present, seront pris, entendus et interprets suivant et conform6ment a la
loicommune d'Angleterre, et que les formes de l'accusation, (d~pouill~s cependant
de toute prolixit6 inutile) le mode de judgement, les rgles pour les preuves, et
toutes les autres procaduers quelconques sur la poursuite desdits crimes, offenses
et d~lits, en changeant ce qui dolt 8tre chang6, se feront conform~ment h ladite
loi commune, . l'exception de cequi sera autrement ordonne par le present Acte."
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LEGISLATION

Article 2260 of the Civil Code of 1825 provided that
neither husband nor wife could be a witness for or against
the other. It further provided that ascendants could not be
witnesses for or against descendants, nor descendants for or
against ascendants,"8 thus extending the common law doctrine of disqualification to include ascendants and descendants. It is further to be noted that this article created a
legal disqualification and that there is no suggestion of privilege as yet. Article 2281 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870
confined the disqualification to husband and wife,17 thus
espousing the anomaly already cast upon the common law,
at least insofar as one spouse was incompetent to testify for
the other. The next legislation in Louisiana was in the form
of an Act.' 8 This Act declared who shall be a competent
witness in a criminal case and still preserved the disqualification that neither husband nor wife could be a witness for
or against the other, except as provided by law. There is
still no suggestion of a possible right of the party-spouse in
a criminal case to have the other spouse testify for the defendant if such testimony were desired. The next applicable
Act 1'merely makes the spouse competent to testify when
the other is on trial for bigamy. Act 157, adopted in 1916,
presents the first suggestion of privilege. The last mentioned
Act provides that "... the competent witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person having
authority to receive evidence, shall be a person of proper
understanding, but: First: Private conversations between
husband and wife shall be privileged. Second: Neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness on any
16 Civil Code of Louisiana (1825) Art. 2260: "Le mari ne peut pas 6tre
temoin pour ou contre sa femme, ni la femme pour ou contre son mali; ilen est
de m~me des ascendans L 'egard de leurs descendans, et des descendans a l'egard
de leurs ascendans."
17 Op. cit. supra note 14.
18 Act 29 of 1886.
19 Act 41 of 1904.
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trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the other . . ." In this Act it is recognized
that private conversations between husband and wife shall
be privileged. This relates to the third situation set out at
the beginning of this paper. It will be well to observe at
this point that the fundamental difference between disqualification and privilege is that the latter may be waived and
the testimony received, whereas the former constitutes a
legal impediment which no act of the parties can overcome."0 On this basis then, private conversations between
husband and wife could be received in evidence under Act
157 of 1916, providing the privilege is waived by the spouses.
The most recent legislation in Louisiana with respect to this
problem has been a provision adopted as a part of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. 2 This Article, according to the terms
of adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure, supersedes
all articles or acts in conflict with it.2 2 In effect then, this
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure represents the
present state of the statutory law on the subject and, so
far as is applicable here, is merely a restatement of Act 157
of 1916, except that the former confines itself to criminal
proceedings only. In brief, until the Act of 1916, the spouses
were incompetent to testify in a case wherein the other was
a party, either for or against the other. The privilege setout in 2, supra, was not recognized as such but rather was
put under class 1, supra, i. e., incompetency. After the Act
of 1916, this incompetency growing out of status was removed inferentially by a definition of the competent witness
broad enough to include husband and wife. However, certain safeguards were established with respect to the marital
relation, and private conversations were placed on the basis
20

4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2175, 2196, 2197, 2242.

21
22

Code of Criminal Procedure for the State of Louisiana (1928) Art. 461.
Code of Criminal Procedure for the State of Louisiana (1928) Articles

582, 583.
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of privilege. Finally, the legislature attempted to deal with
situation 2, supra, fortified by all the confusion of ideas that
had gone before.
In its obvious attempt to create a situation that would
permit the testimony of the witness-spouse in behalf of the
party-spouse and yet confine the qualification within those
bounds, the legislature of the State of Louisiana used the
following language:
".... neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness
on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceed-

ing, against the other . .

." 28

No purpose is served in an attempt to determine what a legislative body intended to accomplish by an enactment, especially when the language used is plain and unambiguous.
However, when the language is not clear and contains ambiguity, something may be accomplished by a statement of
the problem before the legislature, the various possible ends
desired, and the approximation of the language used to the
attainment of any one of these ends. 24 One aspect of the
problem of this discussion, i. e., the distinction between competency and privilege of the spouses, has been stated. The
other aspect of the problem is one of policy. How desirable
is the existence of the privilege of one spouse not to have the
other testify adversely in a criminal case? To decide this
involves a choice between the absolute desirability of truth,
using every available source and the desirability of protecting certain social relationships from harms that might result
from a full application of the search for truth, with a possible corresponding concealment of some material fact. The
common law has traditionally selected the latter alternative,
assuming that marital hardship and distrust will inevitably
result from a relaxation of the rules set up to guard it. A
powerful array of criticism has been directed against this
23 Op. cit. supra note 21.
Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws
(2nd ed., 1911) p. 45 et seq.
24
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attitude, however. 5 It is not the purpose of this discussion
to weigh the relative merits of the two alternatives. Rather,
it suffices for these purposes merely to state the problem in
its entirety. A. The legislature might abolish then the privilege altogether on the ground that the securance of truth was
more to be desired than the possible protection afforded to
the marital relation. It is patent that the legislature of Louisiana has not seen fit to go this far. Is there any middle
ground available? B. The legislature, failing to perceive that
this privilege is distinct from the cloak of incompetency,
might desire to partially remove the cloak (ill-fitting as it is)
so as to make the witness-spouse competent to testify for the
accused, if the accused so desired, and yet maintain the incompetency of the witness-spouse to testify against the
party-spouse. In this situation the privilege (if such it may
be so-called) certainly does not coincide with the common
law privilege. The latter was a privilege not to have the
witness-spouse testify against the party-spouse, thus recognizing a possible waiver and the reception of the adverse
testimony if the privilege were not claimed. In example B.
the witness-spouse would be totally incompetent to testify
against the party-spouse, and the privilege, if any, is confined to the election of the party-spouse to have the favorable testimony of the witness-spouse or not, as he saw fit.
C. Or again, the legislature might desire to maintain the incompetency just mentioned, i. e., with respect to adverse
testimony, and yet make the witness-spouse compellable with
respect to favorable testimony. The effect of this would be
to nullify the so-called privilege of the accused established
in the last case, i. e., to have the favorable testimony or not,
and permit the State to comment upon the failure of the accused to call the witness-spouse in a proper case. D. Furthermore, it might be the purpose of the legislature to make
the witness-spouse competent to testify either for or against
25 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2228-b.

QUALIFICATION OF A SPOUSE AS A WITNESS

the party-spouse, preserving the privilege to one or both not
to have the offered testimony, and yet refuse the State the
authority to call the witness-spouse to testify against the
party-spouse. This would be nothing more than a retention
of the ancient common law privilege considered tog-ther
with the statutory removal of the incompetency attaching
to the favorable testimony of the witness-spouse. It is apparent, from a review of the possible legislative antidotes,
how confusing the problem can become when its real nature
is not comprehended.
ADJUDICATIONS

A review of the cases in Louisiana which have construed
Act 157 of 1916 and Article 461 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure presents an even more appalling spectacle. The
first case under Act 157 of 1916 was State v. Bischoff.2"
This was a prosecution for bigamy. On motion for a new
trial, the defendant urged that his alleged wife was permitted to testify against him, but a "per curiam" (a practice usually followed in Louisiana) informed the reviewing
court that no objection was made to her competency when
she took the stand. The appeal court thereupon held that
the objection had been raised too late since it was heard for
the first time on the motion for a new trial. The opinion
cited the Act, saying that it "permits" but does not compel
one spouse to become a witness for or against the other, and
the wife having testified without objection, the defendant
cannot be heard to complain after conviction. The inference
to be drawn from this decision is that Act 157 of 1916 created a privilege in favor of the party-spouse, which he had
failed to claim and therefore he could not object to the testimony. The case does not decide, however, whether the privilege is exclusively that of the party-spouse. The next case
construing Act 157 of 1916 is State v. Webb."' This was an
26
27

146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919).
156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924).
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indictment for murder. The wife of the defendant was called
by the State and testified against the defendant without objection until the State attempted to elicit testimony about a
conversation that the witness had had with her husband. To
this the defendant objected, which objection was over-ruled,
and the defendant reserved an exception. In disposing of
this portion of the record on appeal, the reviewing court
said, in part:
"... Act 157 of 1916 declares that the competent witness in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, shall be a person of proper understanding.
Under the express terms of this statute the wife was made a competent
witness for or against her husband; the exercise of the privilege being

left entirely to her own inclination and discretion. The husband was
powerless under the terms of the statute to prevent his wife from testifying against him on any matters not expressly prohibited by law..."

How can this language be reconciled with that of the Bischoff
case? In that case, a privilege claimable by the party-spouse
was recognized but held to be waived. In the instant case
the witness-spouse is the sole judge of whether or not he or
she will testify. Thus the privilege now is exclusively that
of the witness-spouse. The next case, State v. Dejean,2 1 reiterates this doctrine wherein the witness-spouse was permitted to testify against the party-spouse over the objection
of the latter. The last case to come before the Supreme
Court of Louisiana 29 involved Article 461 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which Article, as was stated supra, is a
re-enaction of Act 157 of 1916, so far as here applicable.
This case presented the Article squarely before the Court
for interpretation and supplies an interesting example of the
tremendous significance of the usually insignificant comma.
In State v. Todd o the defendant was indicted for murder

and found guilty of manslaughter. On appeal two exceptions were particularly noted. In the trial court the defend28

29

30

106 So. 374 (1925).
State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
Op. cit. supra note 29.
159 La. 900,

QUALIFICATION OF A SPOUSE AS A WITNESS

ant asked for the following instruction to the jury, which
was refused and he took an exception:
"The court charges the jury that a wife has a right, under the law,
to testify for or against her husband, but cannot be forced to do so,
and in case she does not testify, her failure to testify shall not be construed against her husband."

The other exception particularly noted was that taken to the
comment of the District Attorney to the jury on the failure
of the defendant to call his wife to the stand when the evidence demonstrated that she, the defendant, and the deceased victim were the only witnesses to the alleged murder.
In disposing of these exceptions, the reviewing court was
perforce required to interpret the meaning of that part of
Article 461 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was:
"... neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness
on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the other. .."

In arriving at its decision, the prevailing opinion concluded
that the words "against the other" related to the word "witness" and not to the phrase "indictment, complaint or other
criminal proceeding." On the basis of this interpretation, it
was not difficult for the court then to dispose of the exceptions. Since the Article was held to mean that the witnessspouse could not be compelled to be a witness against the
other, its only effect was to prevent the State from calling
the witness-spouse. The opinion goes on further to say:
"There is no sufficient reason why, if a spouse not on trial is to be

a witness at all, such spouse should not be compelled [italics ours] to
testify at the instance of the spouse on trial, as his or her witness ...

The court then concluded that the refusal to give the instruction asked for was not error, and that the objection to the
comment of the District Attorney was not well-taken. The
net result of this decision is that the witness-spouse is now
compellable to testify when called by the other spouse (obviously in his favor), the State is powerless to compel the
witness-spouse to testify (obviously against the defendant),
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but still leaves open the question whether the witness-spouse
might testify against the other at the former's election and
against the wishes of the latter. The case of State v. Bischoff " answers the last question in the negative, and the
case of State v. Webb 32 holds for the affirmative. Obviously this state of the law is anything but satisfactory. A vigorous dissent was voiced by Chief Justice O'Niell in the lastmentioned case, which opinion was concurred in by Mr.
Justice Rogers. The dissenting opinion concerned itself
chiefly with what it considered to be a flagrant violation of
the rules of statutory interpretation and a manifest departure from the intent of the legislature as expressed in the
Article under review. This phase of the problem has been
commented upon elsewhere.3 3
What can be said then with respect to the state of the law
in Louisiana? If Article 461 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be interpreted as if it read "Neither husband
nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness against the other
on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding," some very interesting conclusions may be
drawn. The non-compellability of the spouses with respect
to adverse testimony under this interpretation could be extended to all criminal prosecutions, whether the other spouse
is a party or not. Thus is presented a situation comparable
to that which anciently confronted the common law at the
inception of this whole problem, and which was early disposed of by confining the privilege to anti-marital testimony
unfavorable to the legal interests of the other spouse in the
very case.3 4 Suppose the witness-spouse were willing to give
testimony detrimental to the other spouse in a criminal proceeding in which the latter was not a party. How would the
Supreme Court of Louisiana react to the offer? If it were
31
32
33
34

Op. cit. supra note 26.
Op. cit. supra note 27.
6 Tulane L. Rev. 489.
4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2234.
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held to be admissible, the testimony would no doubt cause
just as much marital disturbance as if the spouse were a
party. If the court denied the admissibility of the testimony,
it would at the same time deny the force of the word "compel." To deny the power to compel merely negatives the
ability to secure the end desired by the exercise of some possible outside effective force.35 The person who is not compellable is not on that account denied the power to do the
act in question, and may elect to do the act of his own volition. Therefore, to deny to the witness-spouse the right to
elect to testify adversely in a collateral proceeding is tantamount to making the witness incompetent to testify against
the other spouse. Is that what the legislature intended? Furthermore, assuming a privilege to have been created, whose
privilege is it, that of the party-spouse, or that of the witnessspouse? According to the plain and obvious meaning of the
words as above transposed, it would seem that the privilege
(so-called) has been reserved to the witness-spouse. It is
against the witness-spouse that no compulsion may be effected, thus confining the election to that spouse as well.
This is more evident when it is remembered that, except for
some legal prohibition applicable, either husband or wife is
a competent witness in a criminal proceeding. 6 The prevailing opinion in the Todd case, however, held that the
witness-spouse was compellable to testify when called by
the party-spouse, assuming, no doubt, that the party-spouse
would call the witness-spouse only for favorable testimony. Under this interpretation then in the Todd case,
the only logical conclusion left for the court would be to
hold that the witness-spouse may elect whether or not to
35 Cf. Webster's New International Dictionary (1932): "Compel-to drive
or urge with force, or irresistibly; to constrain; oblige; necessitate, whether by
physical or moral force. Compel implies the exertion (frequently as if from without) of irresistible physical or moral force or constraint." Cf., also, 2 Words and
Phrases (3rd series), Judicial and Statutory definitions of "compel."
36 Cf. Code of Criminal Procedure for the State of Louisiana (1928) Art.
461, § 1.
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take the stand against the other spouse, whether the latter
is a party or not, and the spouse against whom the testimony is directed is powerless to object. How close does
this conclusion approximate the common law privilege
referred to in the beginning of this paper? This much is
true: A distinction has now been made between testimony
for the party-spouse and testimony against the party-spouse.
The former, since it was a matter of incompetency, is now
admissible since the witness-spouse falls within the definition of the competent witness, and therefore may testify.
According to the Todd case, such testimony is compellable
and the failure of the party-spouse to call the other may be
commented upon adversely. So far as the adverse testimony
of the witness-spouse is concerned, the claim of privilege not
to testify reposes solely with the witness-spouse. Furthermore, the matter is no longer confined to cases wherein the
other spouse is a party but extends to any "trial upon an
indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding." As to
the confinement of the claim of privilege to the witnessspouse exclusively, this seems to conform to the reasons advanced by the common law for the existence of the privilege,
i. e., protection from condemnation by the witness-spouse,

although clear-cut decisions are very few." The latter extension of the matter to cases other than those in which the
spouse was a party was never countenanced by the common
law.88
If the matter were res integra, it would not seem difficult
to determine what the legislature of Louisiana intended when
it enacted the following provision:
"That
or before
person of
wife shall
complaint

the competent witness in any criminal proceeding, in court
a person having authority to receive evidence, shall be a
proper understanding, but ... second: Neither husband nor
be compelled to be a witness on any trial upon an indictment,
or other criminal proceeding, against the other."

37 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2241.
38

4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2234.
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Proviso two is manifestly a restriction on the first statement. If proviso two were omitted, can any one doubt that
a spouse would be a competent witness for any and all purposes, assuming the spouse to be a person of proper understanding? The proviso, then, was for the purpose of excepting a certain class from the operation of the first statement.
If any one, not trained in the subtleties of legal jargon were
asked his opinion as to meaning of clause two above, it is
patent that he would say that the proposed witness-spouse
could not be forced to testify on a trial in which the other
spouse was a party unless the said witness elected so to do.
This simply means that the testimony of the proposed witness-spouse, either for or against the party-spouse, will be
received if the witness-spouse offers it, and not otherwise.
The witness-spouse is not made incompetent to testify, nor
is that witness under any legal obligation to testify. Upon
this interpretation the conclusion must be that a privilege
has been created solely for the benefit of the witness-spouse
and it extends not only to the offer of adverse testimony but
to favorable testimony as well. This analysis does not establish the common law privilege, it is true, but neither does it
do violence to language. And, after all, what sanctity is there
to the common law privilege? Finally, the above interpretation has the force of consistency behind it since it most
closely approximates the exact nature of privilege, per se,
i. e., that it is a claim entirely personal to the witness called. 9
If the policy of the claim of privilege is applied to the last
analysis, what can be said? Not a great deal. If one spouse
were a party in a criminal case and desired the testimony
of the other spouse to prove an alibi, for instance (i. e., favorable testimony), the witness-spouse might elect not to
testify and thus some valuable extenuating evidence is lost to
the defendant. It might be urged in reply, that a spouse
would never refuse to testify in favor of the other. Such a'
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reply simply begs the question, since there are any number
of situations in which a spouse would be unwilling to take
the stand, even to exonerate the other. However, if the legislature of Louisiana desired to invoke this policy, it would be
more conducive to clarity if the Article under consideration 40
were amended by striking out the comma after the word
"proceeding," and inserting a comma after the word "complaint." The enactment would then be identical with that in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts "I where it has been
held that the privilege is that of the witness-spouse.4 2
A review of the cases and an analysis of the legislative
enactments which have attempted to solve this problem
leaves one in a considerable quandry. Nothing positive can
be concluded with respect to the actual policy of the State
of Louisiana. Enough has been written to show that there
is still a confusion of ideas growing out of the failure to appreciate the two distinct ideas with which the legislature is
dealing. If the legislature is desirous of preventing one
spouse from testifying against the other when a partydefendant, but still opens the way for the reception of the
favorable testimony of the witness-spouse, it could be easily
accomplished in simple and precise language. Instead of the
proviso as now written, there should be substituted the following: "Neither husband nor wife shall be competent to
testify against the other on any trial upon an indictment,
complaint, or other criminal proceeding against the other."
Such a provision puts the matter at rest. There is no longer
any question of privilege; it now becames a matter of complete incompetence (i. e., disqualification) so far as adverse
testimony is concerned. Furthermore, it allows for the reCode of Criminal Procedure for the State of Louisiana (1928) Art. 461.
The General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Tercentenary
ed., 1932) c. 233, § 20: ". . . . second: except as otherwise provided . . . neither
husband nor wife shall be compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding against the other."
42 Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N. E. 266 (1912) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 162 Mass. 441, 38 N. E. 1120 (1894).
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ception of favorable testimony since for all other purposes
the spouse qualifies as a competent witness under the definition heretofore alluded to. Finally, there would be no further doubt of the right of the State to comment upon the
failure of the defendant-spouse to produce the favorable
testimony of the other spouse, since the question of privilege
(so-called) would be completely eliminated, even as to favorable testimony. What was the privilege not to have the
adverse testimony of the witness-spouse at common law,
would now be complete disqualification.
The problem confronting the legislature and the courts in
the State of Louisiana is not unlike that encountered in the
other jurisdictions. All of the states have employed legislative antidotes with varying degrees of success. Almost without exception, there has been a fusion of ideas growing out
of a failure to recognize the distinction which the common
law attempted to establish between the incompetency of a
spouse to testify favorably and the privilege of a spouse not
to give adverse testimony. Those states that have attempted
to preserve some form of privilege have inevitably inaugurated a complexity of adjudications which it would be impossible to reconcile. Others have dealt with the problem
on the basis of incompetency. These states have declared
that the witness-spouse is incompetent to testify against the
other when on trial in a criminal case. Among the latter
states may be numbered Texas. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in part:
".... The husband and wife may, in all criminal actions be witnesses
for each other; but they shall in no case testify against each other
except in a criminal prosecution for an offense committed by one
against the other." 43
Pursuant to this legislative pronouncement, it has been
held that when a spouse is a competent witness, he or she
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can be compelled to testify." Further, a spouse cannot
testify against the other even with the consent of the spouse
on trial, except for a crime committed against the other. 5
Nor can the disqualification of a spouse be waived, thus
completely setting at rest any possible question of privilege.46
CONCLUSION

It is possible that some time in the future legislatures and
courts may perceive that the only relation that the incompetency of a spouse to testify for the other bears to the
privilege of a spouse not to have or give adverse testimony
against the other, is that both ideas pertain to husband and
wife. Aside from this, the concepts have no logical nor legal
kinship, as much as the courts and legislatures have been
prone to treat them as bed-fellows. It is possible, too, that
the legislatures will agree upon a definite policy with respect
to the desirability of the truth at whatever the cost as opposed to the notion that demands protection to the marital
state from the disrupting (if such they are) influences produced by the disclosure of anti-marital facts.47 It is hoped
that when this day arrives, the respective legislatures will
express their policies in clear and precise language.
James T. Connor.
Loyola University (New Orleans), School of Law.
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